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Abstract
Background: Compensation for research related injuries is a subject that is increasingly gaining traction in developing
countries which are burgeoning destinations of multi center research. However, the existence of disparate
compensation rules violates the ethical principle of fairness. The current paper presents a comparison of the
policies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS).
Methods: A systematic search of good clinical practice guidelines was conducted employing search strategies
modeled in line with the recommendations of ADPTE Collaboration (2007). The search focused on three main
areas namely bibliographic data bases, clinical practice guidelines data bases and a restricted internet search.
A manual search of references cited in relevant guideline documents was also conducted. The search terms,
Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and key words were developed for a PubMed platform and then adapted
for all other data bases. The search terms were kept constant for each country with the only difference being
the country name. The documents so obtained were subjected to systematic content analysis.
Results: The study revealed that there is vast panoply of regulations which exist on a continuum. On one extreme is
India with comprehensive regulations that are codified into law, and on the other end there is China which does not
have specific laws regulating research related injuries. There are a number of differences and similarities such as
mandatory insurance requirements, existence of no fault compensation, compensable injuries and the role of
research ethics committees.
Conclusions: It is imperative to enact legislations that protect participants without stifling the research enterprise.
There is need for consistency and ideally harmonization of such regulations at a global level. A model policy on
compensation for research related injuries should borrow from the best aspects of the different country policies and
should be informed by the cardinal ethics principles of autonomy, justice and beneficence.
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Background
Extant literature is replete with examples of research
related injuries, and fatalities. The deaths of research
participants Ellen Roche and Jesse Gelsinger [1] received
widespread coverage, both in the media and in academia.
The near disastrous consequences of a clinical trial of the
humanized monoclonal antibody (TeGenero) TGN1412,
complications associated with egg donation for stem cell
research and many other major adverse events have also
received attention [1]. All these, separately and collectively,
bring the question of research injury compensation into
sharp focus.
The moral argumentation for the compensation of re-
search injury is premised on three ethical principles namely
beneficence, justice and reciprocity [2]. The principle of
beneficence dictates that the benefits of research should
outweigh the risks. Hence the risks should be minimized
[3–5]. Risk minimization is two-fold. First, it captures the
need to reduce the risk of conducting research itself.
Second, when injury does occur researchers have an obli-
gation to mitigate the health effects as well as other effects
such as economic loss. The justice principle encapsulates
both distributive and compensatory justice. Distributive
justice requires that the benefits and risks accrued in the
research enterprise should be equitably carried by the
research participants and the society. The participants
bear disproportionately the burdens of participating, and
therefore the burdens associated with mitigation of
research related injuries should be apportioned to society
as a means of equalizing the scales. Undergirded by these
ethical principles a moral consensus has emerged in
favour of compensation for research related injuries. This
consensus is captured in several documents [6–9].
The emerging ethical consensus in favour of compensa-
tion for research related injuries has not been operational-
ized into standard international policies and regulations. In
the absence of specific policies, standards and regulations
for injured participants; those desirous of seeking redress
must rely on TORT law. This poses a serious problem to
injured research participants because tort law, in contradis-
tinction to no fault compensation principles, generally
requires the aggrieved party to prove that the one alleged
to have caused harm was at fault. After this threshold, has
been met, three further requirements should be satisfied.
First, that the researcher did not fulfill a duty owed to the
participant; second, that the researcher’s failure to fulfill
that duty caused the participant’s injury; and third, that the
researcher did not have legal justification for the failure
[10]. The very nature of research means that injured
research participants will have difficulty proving each of
these elements [11]. A good informed consent form clearly
spells out the duty owed by the researcher to the partici-
pant. Research related injuries could still occur in spite of
the researcher diligently fulfilling his obligations. In such a
case, the tort system absolves the researcher. Even in the
case where the researcher fails to fulfill the duty owed the
participant, the participant must still demonstrate a causal
link between the failure and the injury. Demonstrating this
is not easy especially considering the fact that in some
conditions it is not feasible to trace the occurrence of an
injury to a single event. For example, how does one dem-
onstrate that a particular cancer was caused by a specific
failure on the part of the researcher when cancer is known
to occur in the general population not participating in the
research? Where failure is proved and a causal link is dem-
onstrated, if the researcher can proffer a legal justification
for the failure, the case falls on this.
Some research related injuries arise from totally unfore-
seen risks. Since these risks are unforeseen, they cannot be
addressed in the informed consent process. The researcher
cannot also not be faulted for their occurrence. Such
injuries, therefore, fall outside the purview of the tort
system leaving the injured participant with no recourse.
The research enterprise is expanding phenomenally as
is evidenced by the fact that the number of clinical trials
registered on the United States website clinicaltrials.gov
increased from 5636 in 2000 to 167,456 by May 2014, of
which more than 51% were being conducted at sites out-
side the United States [12]. The globalization of the clinical
trials industry has seen countries such as Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa (BRICS) become regional
hubs of clinical trials. Furthermore, it was estimated that,
approximately 30% of the global contract research market
supporting clinical research activities, including research
and development of pharma industries would be out-
sourced to developing countries by 2008 [11]. Research
related injuries in these countries are significant. For
example, documents presented to the Supreme Court in
India in 2013 revealed that between 2005 and 2012 as
many as 2868 participants had died during trials of which
only 82 had been compensated [13]. This necessitates an
investigation into these countries’ research related
injury policies.
The globalization of the research enterprise is happening
at a time when there are no international standards on
compensation of research related injuries. Presently, the
United States has no national standards or policy on com-
pensation of research related injuries [14] and yet it is one
of the major sources and sponsors of global research. The
European Union is guided by the European Regulation no
536/2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for
human use. Disparate standards create problems in the
resolution of injury claims which, in a globalized industry,
will likely emanate from different countries. It becomes
imperative for sponsors of global research to familiarize
themselves with local standards before they choose the
destinations of their research activities. The policies and
regulations of the BRICS, which is a major destination of
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global research, naturally become a primary concern.
Imagine a hypothetical scenario involving five adverse
events leading to death in a multi-center clinical trial con-
ducted in the BRICS countries, with one trial related fatal-
ity occurring in each country. The sponsor is faced with
five different conundrums and the quantum of compensa-
tion, all things being equal, if any, will be different in each
case. A system in which participants who suffer similar
injuries receive differential compensation patently violates
the ethical principle of fairness.
This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that under
United States (U.S.) federal regulations, U.S. sponsors, who
constitute a significant contributor in terms of both volume
and number to the global research enterprise, particularly
the (National Institutes of Health) NIH, are not required to
provide compensation for the treatment of research-related
injury for trial participants or to allow grant funds to be
used by investigators for appropriate insurance [15]. This
poses a serious challenge in developing countries where
most participants have no access to health insurance. The
absence of adequate compensation for research related in-
juries places an extra strain on already poorly resourced
healthcare systems in the developing world.
The primary objective of this study was to perform a
comparative analysis of the compensation for research-
related injury policies of the BRICS countries and
propose a more protective model for the insurance and
compensation of the injured research participants. The
secondary objectives were as follows:
 To determine whether there are voluntary or
compulsory requirements to obtain insurance for
research participants in each country.
 To identify the kind of compensable injuries with
emphasis on death, serious harm, pain suffering and
economic losses.
 To determine whether there are any exclusions spelt
out in policies
 To identify the actors responsible for providing
compensation
 To determine whether no- fault compensation is
provided for in cases where negligence cannot be
established.
 To identify the actors responsible for adjudication
and their responsibilities.
 To establish the roles of Research Ethics
Committees (RECs) in compensation for research
related injuries.
Methods
Guided by the research objectives a systematic search of
good clinical practice guidelines was conducted employing
search strategies modeled in line with the recommenda-
tions of ADAPTE Collaboration (2007) [16]. The search
focused on three main areas namely bibliographic
data bases, clinical practice guidelines data bases and
restricted internet search. A manual search of references
cited in relevant guideline documents was also conducted.
The list of data bases consulted is contained in Table 1
below. The search terms, Medical Subject Headings
(MeSH) and key words were developed for a PubMed plat-
form and then adapted for all other data bases. The search
terms were kept constant for each country with the only
difference being the country name. The following search
terms were used for all the data bases: research related in-
jury compensation policies; medical related injury com-
pensation; clinical trial related injury compensation;
compensable injuries; exclusions. For some data bases
extra search terms were used. These are shown in Table 1.
The internet search revealed that the Office of Human
Research Protection (OHRP) [12] annually publishes a
compilation of international human research standards
that covers the policies and standards for all the countries
in the current study. The documents found on this website
were identical with the documents found from other
sources. Documents that were not in English were trans-
lated using both translate.google.com and freetranslate.com.
These translations were then compared to the English
versions found on the OHRP website. The documents so
Table 1 List of data bases and search terms
Data Base Location Extra Search Terms
CINAHL www.ebscohost.com
Embase www.embase.com
Web of Science Wokinfo.com
PubMed www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed
National Guidelines Clearinghouse www.guidelines.gov Guidelines; policies; recommendations; compensable injuries
Guideline International Network Library www.g-i-n.net Guidelines; policies; recommendations; compensable injuries;
National Library of Medicine www.nlm.nih.gov Guidelines; policies; recommendations;
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence www.nice.org.uk Guidelines; policies; recommendations;
Google Google.com Guidelines; policies; recommendations;
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obtained were subjected to systematic content analysis. For
each country information on seven variables was collected.
These variables are: the existence of a written policy, insur-
ance policy requirements, compensable injuries, exclusions,
and actors responsible for compensation, existence or
absence of no-fault provisions, actors responsible for adju-
dication of claims and the roles of the RECs. Although
there were grammatical differences between the translated
documents; there were no differences in the content of the
variables of interest. All other relevant information not cap-
tured by these variables was also gathered and categorized.
Results
The results are summarized in Table 2 below.
Brazil
In Brazil research-related injuries are covered by reso-
lution 196/96 of the Brazilian parliament on research
involving human subjects sections V5 to V7 which
states that:
“V.5 The researcher, the sponsor and the institution
must assume full responsibility for providing comprehensive
care to the research subjects, as regards complications and
injury resulting from foreseen risks.”
“V.6 Research subjects that suffer any type of injury
resulting from their participation in the research, regardless
of such injury having been foreseen in the terms of consent,
or not, have the right to receive comprehensive medical
care, as well as an indemnity.”
“V.7 Under no circumstance will the research subject
be required to waive his/her right to indemnity for injury
resulting from the research. The form used in obtaining
the freely given and informed consent of the research
subjects must not contain any clause exempting the
researcher from responsibility or depriving any individual
of his/her legal rights, including the right to seek an
indemnity for injury resulting from the research.”
(National Health Commission,2014)[17]
Furthermore, injury is defined as “Injury associated
to or resulting from research - immediate or delayed
injury to an individual or community, with proven, direct
or indirect, causal relationship resulting from the scientific
study while Indemnity –is financial compensation
provided as a reparation of immediate or delayed injury
caused by research to a human subject of such research.”
Premised on this resolution Brazilian law does make
provision for compensation but does not make it
compulsory for sponsors of research to provide insur-
ance prior to commencement of trials. This compen-
sation comes in two forms. First, there is
“comprehensive medical care” designed to ameliorate
any injury or complications resulting from participa-
tion in research. This injury, per the definition, can
be immediate or delayed. This suggests that medical
cover should include cover for late effects. However,
the regulations do not specify a time limit for the
delayed injuries. Some injuries such as some radiation
effects or some genetic effects have relatively high
latency. Hence, the silence on the time within which
claims can be made is a weakness in the regulations
from the sponsor’s viewpoint. Furthermore, the reso-
lution is unambiguous in identifying that “the
sponsor, the investigator and the institution” assume
full responsibility for medical care. However, it does
not specify whether they are severally or individually
liable and in what proportion they assume this
responsibility.
The second form of compensation is “indemnity”.
This is financial compensation provided as reparation of
injury which can either be immediate or delayed. To
qualify for indemnity the research participants must
have suffered any type of injury. The implication is that
both physical and psychological injuries are covered.
The resolution does not make mention of economic
losses; therefore, it can be surmised that the drafters of
the resolution did not intend to include such losses.
Table 2 Summary of findings
Country Written
Policy
Voluntary
insurance/
Compulsory
Compensable injuries Exclusions Actors
responsible
for
compensation
No fault
compensation
Ajudicator Legal
enforceabi-lity
Brazil Yes No All injuries; death Failure to prove negligence Sponsor
Investigator
Research
Institution
No Courts Yes
Russia Yes Yes Death, 1st, 2nd, 3rd degree
disability, none disabling
injuries
Economic losses
Psychological injuries
Sponsor No Insurance
Companies
Yes
India Yes No All injuries including non trial
related and economic losses
No Sponsor Yes The Licensing
Authority; REC and
Expert Committee
Yes
China No No Product quality liability; Drug
administration errors
Injuries due to medication and procedures that
meet minimum national and industry standards
Sponsor No None No
South
Africa
Yes Yes Bodily injuries
Enduring injuries
Psychological injuries; non- enduring injuries Sponsor Strict liability Courts No
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The silence of the regulations on the issue of economic
losses is a disadvantage to the participant. Clarity on this
issue helps inform the prospective participant’s decision. In
the absence of cover for economic losses the participant
has an option to take the risk and enroll on the research
without insurance cover or to explore alternative insurance
arrangements. Placing the burden of economic losses,
which can in some cases be substantial, on the shoulders of
the participant is a double burden The participant must not
only assume the risk of participating in an enterprise meant
for the benefit of society, but also carry the burden of arran-
ging at the participant’s cost insurance against economic
loss. The society on its part does nothing but reap the
benefits of the participant’s benevolence. This patently
violates the principle of justice.
The resolution does not prescribe the path to be
followed by aggrieved research participants. It also offers
no guidance in the determination of the quantum of the
indemnity. In the absence of a clear prescription on the
path to be followed the aggrieved participants would
have to seek recourse in the civil courts, which can
prove to be burdensome. Furthermore, whereas the
resolution is clear that the sponsor, the investigator and
the institution are responsible for comprehensive medical
cover, it is silent on who should be responsible for the
indemnity. The assumption is that the same parties would
shoulder the responsibility of indemnifying the injured
participants. Who should the aggrieved research partici-
pant approach? Should such a participant join all the
parties in the civil action in the event of dispute?
The resolution makes no reference to “no fault”
compensation. However, the prosaic definition of repar-
ation is “the action of making amends for a wrong one
has done, by providing payment or other assistance to
those who have been wronged.” Indemnity as defined in
Brazilian law is “a reparation” and reparation presup-
poses that wrong has been done by the one paying the
reparation. The indemnity provision, therefore does not
meet the basic dictates of the “no fault” compensation
principle. The law goes on to state that “Under no
circumstance will the research subject be required to
waive his/her right to indemnity for injury resulting from
the research.” This provision caters for all the different
scenarios that can result in injury including incidences in-
volving the participant’s actions contributing to his harm.
Although the role of the REC is not explicitly enun-
ciated, the law stipulates that the informed consent
form “must not contain any clause exempting the
researcher from responsibility or depriving any
individual of his/her legal rights, including the right
to seek an indemnity for injury resulting from the
research” Hence RECs should study protocols
carefully and ensure that they do not violate this
provision.
Russia
In Russia, research- related injuries are governed by the
Russian Federation Law №61-FZ March 24, 2010 On
Circulation of Medicines. Chapter 7 Clinical Trials of
Medicinal Products for Medical use, Clinical Trial
Contract, Rights of Patients Involved in Trials - Article
44. Compulsory Insurance of Life and Health of the
Patient Involved in Clinical Trial of Medicinal Product
for Medical Use.
The law mandates the institutions that have acquired
permission to conduct clinical trials to obtain compulsory
insurance for all research participants. The insurance
covers the life of the participant as well as health impair-
ment. The restriction of the insurance to the life of the
participant precludes cover of babies injured in utero.
Health impairment is further categorized into four groups
namely first-degree disability, second-degree disability,
third degree disability and harm that does not cause dis-
ability. The law further stipulates the quantum of the
damages to be paid as follows: death (Russian Rupees)
RUR 2.0 million; first degree disability RUR 1.5 million;
second degree disability RUR 1.0 million; third degree dis-
ability RUR 500,000 and not more than RUR 300,000 for
harm which does not cause disability. To put these figures
into context, it is worthy highlighting that according to
Rosstat the average annual income of a Russian worker
was 257,000 Russian Rupees in January 2016 [18]. The
compensation for harm that does not cause disability is
therefore more than the average annual income.
The law offers no guidance on how disputes over the
degree of disability are to be resolved. There is a
provision in the law which allows the courts to increase
the quantum of the compensation, but circumstances
that merit an increase of the quantum of compensation
are not spelt out.
The term of the insurance cover shall not be less than
the term of the clinical trial and standard insurance
terms and conditions apply. Since standard insurance
contract rules normally do not pay when the insured
person is at fault, injured research participants whose in-
juries arise because of non-compliance or negligence on
their part may not be compensated. This scheme is thus
not a no fault scheme, making it fall short of the
minimum required ethical standard.
The claims should be satisfied within the time limit
prescribed by the law for civil litigation. Thus, delayed
effects linked to the research but appearing after the pre-
scribed time are not claimable under this law. Once the
necessary documentation has been presented the insurer
is obliged by law to make payment within thirty days.
There is also a provision for the insurer to make partial
payment at the request of the affected participant while
the full extent of the harm is being established. The par-
tial payment covers the harm that has already been
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established definitively. It is the responsibility of the
federal executive body which issues permits for clinical
trials to make sure that the institutions conducting clinical
trials have obtained the requisite insurance. The process
to be followed to make claims is not described save to say
that standard terms applying to compulsory insurance
shall apply.
The law is silent on the issue of “no fault” compensation.
However, it refers to the application of “standard rules for
compulsory insurance.” Such rules are normally stringent
and restrictive. The law provides for insurance to be put in
place for the life and health of the participant and does not
extend to cover economic losses. When economic losses
are substantial and devastating the scales of distributive
justice are tipped against the participant.
Psychological injuries are not mentioned directly but
may possibly be covered under injuries that cause no
harm. However, the quantum of compensation for such
injuries is capped at RUR 300,000, which is the lowest.
This suggests that injuries that cause no physical harm
are less debilitating than physical injuries. Clearly, this is
not the case as some physical injuries are of a transient
nature while some post stress disorders can be enduring.
The role of the REC, with regards to compensation, is to
ensure that sponsors of research have made adequate
insurance arrangements.
India
In India, the compensation for research related injuries
is governed by the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules. This law
specifically deals with clinical trials. A raft of amend-
ments was made to the rules in 2013 in response to
perceived exploitation of research participants.
Documents presented to the Supreme Court in India in
2013 revealed that between 2005 and 2012 as many as
2868 participants had died during trials of which only 82
had been compensated [13]. The high mortality coupled
to the very small proportion of compensated participants
gave impetus to the new legal regime.
The law lucidly spells out several issues. First, it refers
to injury occurring to clinical trial subjects, and then in-
jury occurring to clinical trial subjects that is related to
the clinical trial. The major import of this provision is
that a distinction is made between injuries related to the
clinical trial and injuries not related to the clinical trial.
However, both types of injuries are to be compensated.
The compensation of injuries not related to the research
is unique in compensation literature. For the avoidance
of disputes, the law states that, “In case of injury or
death of a person in course of a clinical trial, whether
such injury or death has been caused due to the clinical
trial, shall be decided by the Drugs Controller General
of India or such authority in such manner as may be
prescribed.”
Secondly, the law makes a further distinction in the
approaches to the compensation of the two types of in-
juries. For the injury that occurs during a clinical trial
but is not related to the trial compensation takes the
form of comprehensive medical care for as long as is ne-
cessary. For the injuries that are related to the clinical
trial, over and above comprehensive medical treatment
the injured participant or his nominees also receive a
financial compensation in the event of death.
Third, the power to determine the quantum of the
compensation is reposed in the Drugs Controller
General of India. After an adverse event, has occurred
the investigator is compelled to make a detailed report
to the Chairman of the Ethics Committee, the head of
the institution where the trial is being conducted and the
Licensing Authority within 10 calendar days. In the event
of death, the report is sent to the Expert Committee instead
of the Licensing Authority. The Ethics Committee is then
required to present a report to the Licensing Authority
within 21 days after receiving the investigator’s report or to
the Expert Committee in the event of death. In cases on in-
juries that are not fatal, the Licensing Authority makes a
ruling within 3 months of receiving the report from the
Ethics Committee. After the ruling the Sponsor or person
conducting the trial must make compensation and provide
the Licensing Authority with details of the payment within
30 days of receiving the ruling.
Failure to pay compensation in terms of the ruling at-
tracts a prison term of 2 years and a fine double the
compensation due to the injured person. The sponsor
may also be banned from conducting any clinical trials
in India. In the event of death, the Expert Committee
must make its recommendations on the cause of death
and the quantum of compensation to the Licensing
Authority within 30 days of receiving the Ethics Committee
report, and thereafter the Licensing Authority should make
its ruling within 3 months. In the case of death, the Law is
crafted in such a way that compensation should be paid
within 6 months (10 days for the investigator’s report
21 days for the Ethics Committee to report to the Expert
Committee, 30 days for the Expert Committee to make its
recommendations, 3 months for the Licensing Authority to
decide and 30 days for the sponsor to provide proof and
details of compensation.) For all other injuries compensa-
tion is paid within 5 months since the process is
streamlined to exclude the Expert Committee.
Fourth, per the Law the Ethics Committee makes an
opinion on the cause and the quantum of compensation to
the Expert Committee; in turn the Expert Committee
makes recommendations to the Licensing Authority who in
turn makes the decision. The law is silent on how the
quantum of compensation is to be determined. It is there-
fore incumbent upon the Ethics Committees to acquire the
skills and expertise to make assessments on compensation.
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Furthermore, the Informed Consent Forms should re-
flect extra information, such as earnings and occupation
that assists the Ethics Committees in their assessments.
The investigator therefore acquires private information
from the participant which may not necessarily have any
relevance to the study. This gives rise to a dilemma. On
one hand, the Ethics Committees encroach on the priv-
acy of the participants, while on the other hand they
need the information in order to determine the quantum
of damages in the event of research related injury. This
issue therefore needs to be properly canvassed during
the informed consent process.
Fifth; the law explicitly catalogues reasons behind
injuries that should be compensated. These are:
 Adverse effect of investigational product (s).
 Any clinical trial procedures involved in the study.
 Violations of approved protocols.
 Failure of investigational product to provide
intended therapeutic effect
 Use of placebo in placebo controlled trials
 Adverse effects due to concomitant medications
excluding standard care
 Injury to children in utero due to parent’s
participation in a clinical trial.
The Indian Law applies the “no fault” compensation
principle and goes further to include failure of investiga-
tional product to provide therapeutic effect as a com-
pensable offence and the use of placebo. This is atypical
and may have been informed by concerns that investiga-
tional products were being administered disguised as
placebos. The pressure on the researchers to report a
therapeutic effect may inadvertently introduce
interpretation biases [19].
It can be argued that viewed through the prism of the
sponsor, the Indian Law is pro- participant, and punitive
towards the sponsor, indeed so punitive as to border on
the draconian and the immoral. The law, for example,
does not take into consideration that in some cases
research participants may contribute, through non-
compliance or other acts of omission or commission, to
their injuries.
Thus, where contributory liability may be appropriate,
the law, seemingly oblivious of the fallibility and foibles
of the research participant, places the entire burden on
the sponsor. This approach smacks of ethical illogicality
to the extent that it punishes the sponsor, whose invest-
ment in the research enterprise may benefit the society
as whole, and rewards the deviant participant, whose ac-
tions stand to prejudice the society. However, from the
viewpoint of the participants the stringent legal regime
helps to offset the massive power differential between
powerless participants and very powerful sponsors.
Distinction is not made between participants injured
in phase 1 trials who have no direct benefit from the
trial and those injured in phase 3 or 4 trials that may be
patients whose last hope is in the drug on trial and
therefore stand to benefit immensely. Certainly, in phase
3 and 4 trials, the burden to bear the risk is dispropor-
tionately thrust on the shoulders of the sponsor. This is
blatant violation of the distributive justice tenets. The
role of the REC extends beyond prosaic REC roles to in-
clude formulating recommendations on the quantum of
damages. It can be argued that this departure from
orthodoxy is justified in a society where participants are
unlikely to independently approach the courts for deter-
mination of quantum of damages. This can then be seen
not as a new role but just another layer on the REC’s
duty to protect the interests of the participants.
China
In China, clinical trials are regulated by the China Food
and Drug Administration and the instrument of regula-
tion is the Provisions for Clinical Trials of Medical
Devices (State Food and Administration Agency) SFDA
Order 5 of 2004), Good Clinical Practice on Medical
Device Clinical Trials (2016) and Guidelines on Ethical
Review of Drug Clinical Trials (2010).
. Article 4 of the order states that, “Clinical trials of
medical devices should be conducted in accordance with the
ethical principles contained in World Medical Association
Declaration of Helsinki, respecting human dignity, striving
for maximal benefit for the testing subject, and avoiding
harm as best one may.” Article 8 (5) provides that,
“Implementer should provide appropriate compensation
for the testing subject. The related content of compensation
should be described in the clinical trials contract of the
medical devices.” The different guidelines also refer to
the Helsinki declaration. However, the different regula-
tions do not make mention of research related injuries
at all. It can be surmised that the compensation referred
to in Article 8 refers to payments made to research par-
ticipants as reimbursement for expenses incurred. In
2012 the Ministry of Health made known its intention
to put in place a regulation concerning ethical review for
biomedical research on human participants. However,
extant literature review could not locate such a piece of
legislation. In the presence of such a lacuna in legisla-
tion, aggrieved research participants may file civil suits
in Chinese courts. In doing so they can rely on Article
93 of the Drug Administration Law which states that
“drug manufacturers, drug distributors or medical
institutions that violate the provisions of this Law and
thus cause harm and losses to users of drugs shall
bear the liability of compensation in accordance with
law.” The law does not address the issue of injuries to
research participants. For aggrieved participants to
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receive compensation the medical treatment should be
established as the cause of the injury, the process to
claim the compensation is often too long and the costs
are too prohibitive and often the compensation is too lit-
tle [20, 21]. Chapter 4 of the Product Quality Law pro-
vides for compensation for injuries caused by product
defects but defines defect in terms of non-compliance to
industry standard. If a manufacturer of a defective product
that causes harm or injury can prove that the said product
meets the national or industry standard, such a manufac-
turer would be absolved of any wrong doing. Furthermore,
if a drug is approved by the China Food and Drug
Administration agency, by definition, it cannot be defect-
ive and therefore no claims against it can be made. All the
sponsor needs to do is to demonstrate that the investiga-
tional product was produced in conformity with industry
standards.
Chinese Law therefore does not employ strict “no
fault” approach to determination of research related
injuries. Injuries not traceable to product quality defects
are not covered and, to the extent that the law does not
cover the full gamut of research injuries, it appears to be
inadequate.
As an alternative to the “no fault approach” Chinese
courts have tended to adopt the Equitable Liability
Doctrine, whereby a court orders the manufacturer of de-
fective drugs, who may have been deemed not to be at
fault, to assume contributory liability and pay part of ex-
penses suffered by the injured participant [21]. A couple of
cases are worth noting. In 2006 a woman died 36 days after
enrolling on a trial sponsored by Pfizer to test the drug
code named “su011248”. The woman started experiencing
adverse reactions soon after enrolling on the study. After
her death, the husband brought a law suit against Pfizer.
The matter took more than 4 years before the Chinese
courts. Ultimately the Beijing Number 1 Intermediate
Court made an award of $47,460, which Pfizer maintains
was contributory liability. This was even though documents
before the courts revealed that of the 78 participants
enrolled by Pfizer worldwide on the trial, 8 died of adverse
reactions shortly after taking the drug. Similarly, in 2000, a
patient in Jiangxi Province sued a drug manufacturer after
developing encephalitis because of taking the manufac-
turer’s drug. The court ruled that the drug met industry
standards and that the cause of the encephalitis was the pa-
tient’s own physical idiosyncrasy. However, the patient was
awarded compensation on the Equitable Liability Doctrine
to assist him ameliorate the high expenses of coping with
encephalitis. The manufacturer was ordered to contribute
30% towards the patient’s medical expenses [21].
South Africa
The cornerstone of the South African ethical-legal frame-
work for regulating clinical trials is the Department of
Health’s Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of
Clinical Trials with Human Participants in South Africa
(2006) based on the Association of British Pharmaceutical
Industries (ABPI) guidelines. This is a very comprehensive
framework which catalogues the circumstances and
requirements which must be met for injured participants to
be compensated. The cardinal provisions of the framework
are according to the Department of Health (2006)[22]:
 All participants in clinical trials must be covered by
comprehensive insurance for injury and damage.
 The sponsor should pay compensation to
patient-volunteers suffering bodily injury, including
death but the caveat is that the sponsor’s obligation
to pay no fault compensation is without legal
commitment.
 Compensation must be paid when on a balance of
probabilities, the injury was attributable to the trial
or any intervention that would not have been
necessary without the trial.
 A child injured in utero due to the participation of
the mother in the trial shall be paid as if the child
was a patient-volunteer in the trial
 Compensation should be paid only for more serious
injury of an enduring and disabling nature
 Compensation should be paid for injuries caused by
procedures adopted to deal with adverse events
 The sponsor is under strict liability in respect of
injuries caused by the research regardless of the
existence or otherwise of negligence by the sponsor
 The sponsor has no obligation to pay compensation for:
1. Failure of medicinal product to have its intended
effect or provide any other benefit
2. Injury caused by other licensed products
administered to the participant for the purposes of
comparison with product under trial
3. Placebo in consideration of its failure to have a
therapeutic benefit
4. The extent that injury has been caused by a
departure from the agreed protocol; the wrongful
act or default of a third party or through
contributory negligence (In all these cases
compensation may be abated)
 The amount of compensation should be paid in
proportion to the severity and persistence of the
injury and should be consistent with the quantum of
damages commonly awarded by South African
courts where legal liability is admitted
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 Compensation may be abated or excluded altogether
in the following cases:
1. The seriousness of the disease being treated
2. The degree of probability that adverse reactions will
occur, and any warning given
3. The risks and benefits of the established treatments
relative to those known or suspected of the trial
medicines
 Claims should be made to the sponsor by the
participant preferably through the investigator
 Claims shall be made for injuries occurring at
whatever time from the participation of the research
participant in the trial, but not for injuries that may
occur due to extended treatment beyond the trial
 The participant has a right to pursue legal remedy
in respect of injury alleged to have been caused by
the trial
 Participants will normally be asked to accept that
payments made under the guidelines are in full
settlement of the claims.
For claims to succeed at least 3 requirements should
be satisfied. These are conduct, harm and causation. The
claimant must demonstrate that an act or omission on
behalf of the researchers or sponsors lead to harm
(conduct); serious bodily injury of an enduring nature
was incurred from a trial product or procedure (harm);
and that the harm would not have occurred but for trial
participation, and that an unbroken link exists between
the conduct and the harm. [21] There is no compensa-
tion for temporary pain or discomfort or for less serious
or curable complaint
The definition of harm under the South African law is
problematic. It takes cognizance of only two characteris-
tics namely, bodily and endurance. This trivializes debili-
tating injuries that may be transient but more exacting
than some long-term injuries. The term “injury of an
enduring nature” is also an ambiguity that raises the
question-how long is enduring? Is temporary blindness
that resolves after 6 months enduring, for example? Or
is it so ephemeral that it does not merit compensation?
Restricting harm to only bodily injury fails to appreciate
the potential virulence of some psychological, social and
emotional injuries given the vast amount of HIV, gender
violence and other psychological and socio-behavioral
research conducted in South Africa.
The prescription that aggrieved participants should
preferably make their claims through the investigator
fails to take into consideration the possible conflict of
interest that may arise because of the symbiotic relation-
ship between the investigator and the sponsor. Indeed,
in some cases the investigator may also be the sponsor,
thus creating conflicts of interest [23].
The guidelines also permit the sponsor to transfer
some of or all his obligations to a contract research
organization. If the obligation to pay compensation is
not transferred, then the injured participant must seek
recompense from the sponsor and this is usually in a
foreign court in the case of international multi center
research. This can be problematic and prohibitive.
In the case of Venter vs Roche Products and Dr.
Gouws and Partners Inc. the court ruled that “by signing
the patient information leaflet-informed consent, in
which the possible risks of his participation in the trial
are fully canvassed, (the) plaintiff accepted the risk of
injury by virtue of his participation in a trial. Normally,
he would not have the right to claim any damages
caused by a trial related injury, as his informed consent
constituted a ground of justification for administering of
the medication, which could cause him physical harm.”
[19, 24] This is contrary to the consensus of bioethicists
that informed consent to the risks only authorises that
research to proceed, and should not be construed as a
waiver of compensation [25].
South African courts are therefore inclined towards
viewing a signed informed consent document properly
canvassing the risks inherent in the study as absolving
the sponsor from the obligation to pay compensation.
The provision that compensation is in accordance with
ABPI guidelines is also not helpful as “the guidelines
recommend compensation without legal commitment,
therefore payments which may be made in terms of the
guidelines, are to be made ex gratia.” The South African
guidelines therefore place a heavy burden on the shoulders
of the injured participant. The guidelines do not enunciate
the role of RECs with regards to compensation for
research related injuries.
Discussion
A comparison of the policies of the BRICS countries re-
veals that there is a vast panoply of regulations which
exist on a continuum in these countries. On one ex-
treme end is India with comprehensive regulations that
are codified into law, and on the other end there is
China which does not have specific laws regulating re-
search related injuries. There are many differences and
similarities.
The first major difference is in the provision of
mandatory insurance. Regulations in Russia and South
Africa mandate sponsors of clinical trials to provide in-
surance cover to participants. However, the insurance
cover does not indemnify investigators and research
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institutions. Both the South African regulations and
Russian regulations link the quantum of compensation
to the severity of the injuries. However, whereas Russian
regulations go further to prescribe the amounts to be
paid, the South African regulations state that the
quantum of compensation should be consistent with
awards by South African courts. Brazil and India contain
provisions for the compensation for research related in-
juries in their regulations, but do not require explicit
provision of insurance cover. China has no specific law
to deal with research related injuries, and aggrieved par-
ticipants must rely on civil action based on Product
Quality laws and Drug Administration laws. Although
the requirement to provide compensation is part of the
law it is not equivalent to insurance cover.
The second area of major difference is in compensable
injuries. Brazil, India and South Africa have regulations
that cover both medical treatment and financial com-
pensation over and above the medical expenses. How-
ever, in South Africa compensation is for bodily injuries
of an enduring nature while in India all injuries are com-
pensable. Furthermore, in South Africa compensation is
in accordance with ABPI guidelines which recommend
ex gratia payment without legal obligation. Only India
provides for the compensation of economic losses. The
inclusion of placebos, failure of investigational products
to provide intended therapeutic effect and injury from
concomitant medications are other unique features of
Indian regulations. Russian regulations are silent on
medical expenses. South African regulations adopt a
“strict liability approach” which closely resembles a no-
fault approach. Similarly, India enforces a strict no fault
liability approach. This is in contradistinction to the ap-
proaches in China, Brazil and Russia where negligence
must be established. China is unique to the extent that
adherence to industry and national standards exonerates
the sponsor from any harm arising from the administra-
tion of the products. An ideal approach should impose
an ethical obligation on the sponsor to pay for medical
expenses, financial compensation for both long term and
short-term injuries which should be defined broadly to
include both non-physical injuries and compensation for
economic losses.
The third area of dissimilarity is in the process to be
followed to claim compensation. The India regulations
spell out a step by step process with well-defined time
lines. The Russian regulations recommend the standard
terms and rules pertaining to mandatory insurance cover
claims. The South African regulations are unique in
recommending that claims should preferably be made
through the investigator. Brazilian regulations offer no
guidance on how the claims are to be handled which im-
plies that claimants should follow civil court processes.
In Brazil, the responsibility for payment lies with the
sponsor, the investigator and the institution while in
Russia and South Africa payment is from the insurance
policy though further legal action is not precluded. In
India, the ultimate responsibility is reposed in the sponsor.
The Indian regulations facilitate expeditious resolution of
claims and should be adopted as the standard.
The fourth sphere of dissimilarity is in the role of the
research ethics committees. In this regard India is pecu-
liar in that the regulations require the research ethics
committees to provide opinions on the cause of the
injury and the quantum of compensation although the
final decision is made by the licenser. All other countries’
regulations are silent on this issue. Determination of the
cause of injury or injury leading to death requires special
skills which may not be in the province of competence of
most research ethics committee members. In the case of
death; post mortems may be necessary; while in the case
of injuries from concomitant medications pharmacology
expertise may be required. Determination of the quantum
of compensation is even more complex. To execute their
mandate research ethics committee members in India
need extra skills that are not necessarily required in other
countries in the study.
Furthermore, all the countries do not make a distinction
between early phase trials involving healthy volunteers
and late phase trials with patients. It can be argued that “a
same size fits all” approach does not pass the moral test of
fairness. Healthy volunteers who have no direct benefit
from the medicinal products ought to be compensated
better than patients who may be on the trial having
exhausted other standard care alternatives. Additionally,
patients on trials also benefit from closer attention and
monitoring; a benefit not shared by patients on standard
care. The Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry (ABPI) addresses this oddity by recommending
differential compensation approaches depending on the
phase of the clinical trial.
Of the five countries under comparison India has by
far the most comprehensive and most stringent regula-
tions. Distributive justice requires that the benefits and
risks accrued in the research enterprise should be equit-
ably carried by the research participants and the society,
while compensatory justice dictates that he who has in-
jured has an obligation to compensate the injured part.
Often this argument is proffered in advancing the case
of the injured subjects. However, in the Indian case, the
law requires the sponsor to compensate the participant
for injuries arising from concomitant medications as
well as for placebos. These are formulations that the
sponsor has no control over. The ethical soundness of re-
quiring the sponsor to compensate for injuries arising from
placebos and concomitant medications is questionable.
The requirement to provide medical treatment for as long
as is necessary and provide financial compensation to the
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same participant could be perceived as “overkill” as some
of these participants may require medical treatment until
death. Where adequate compensation has been provided,
the participant should use this compensation to access
medical care. The regulations should explicitly state
whether the medical expenses will be covered by the com-
pensation package otherwise the participant may benefit
unjustly through double recovery.
Second, while the participants and the society at large
arrogate to themselves the benefits of the research all
their risks are indemnified by the law. The society bears
no risks at all. In other countries, notably France, the
law stipulates that the sponsor compensates the partici-
pants for injuries suffered in early phase trials where the
healthy volunteer does not stand to benefit from the me-
dicinal products, while the society through state funded
health insurance, and assumes responsibility for injuries
in late phase trials. Placing the burden of compensation
excessively on the shoulders of the sponsor through over
regulation can have unintended consequences and
impede the research enterprise. The number of clinical
trials intended to be registered in India fell from 267 in
2010 to 189 in 2012 and 97 in 2013 [26]. The actual
number of clinical trials registered declined from almost
500 in 2011 to 19 in 2013 after introduction of the new
regulations [27]. In the months following the introduc-
tion of the regulations the National Health Institutes
(NIH) discontinued 40 clinical trials [15]. Furthermore,
the number of new drugs registered in India slipped
from 270 in 2008 to 23 in 2013. During the same time
India lost its position as the number one destination of
clinical trials to China as some sponsors appeared to
choose the path of least resistance [27, 19]. If the strin-
gent regulations are diligently enforced sponsors may
elect to take their projects to more research friendly des-
tinations. Ultimately, it is the patients who suffer when
the research enterprise is impeded. As noted earlier
presently there is no consistency in approach towards
research related injuries. This lacuna is made worse by
the absence of an international best practice. It is there-
fore important that ethicists should become seized with
discussions on formulating an international best practice
on compensation for research related injuries. Such a
model should make the provision of insurance by spon-
sors of research studies and the contract organizations,
when the conduct of research is contracted out to an-
other party, mandatory. A clear distinction should be
made between provision of medical treatment for as
long as is necessary and compensation for research re-
lated injury. The provision of medical treatment should
not in any way detract from the sponsor’s duty to pay
compensation over and above the medical treatment.
Compensation should be all encompassing and include
physical injury, non-physical injury, economic loss and
pain. It should also extend to injury in utero. However,
an exception should be made for placebos and failure for
investigational products to show the intended thera-
peutic impact. Where injury is caused by the partici-
pant’s deliberate non-adherence to protocol the doctrine
of contributory negligence and liability should apply as a
limit to the blanket no fault compensation approach.
This is likely to dissuade the participants from engaging
in non-compliance which neither benefits the participant
nor the research enterprise in general. Distinction
should also be made between compensation in clinical
trial phases where the participant has no direct benefit
such as phase 1 trials and phase 4 trials where there may
be a direct benefit to the participant. The French ap-
proach whereby compensation for injury in early phase
trials is assumed by the sponsors of the research and
compensation for injuries in late stage trials is taken
over by the state through a state funded health insurance
should be adopted as best practice. The informed con-
sent form and the participant information leaflet should
explicitly mention the provision of no fault insurance
and spell out the process to be followed to access such
claims. This should be comprehensive and should in-
clude the relevant timelines as in the Indian regulations.
The responsibility to adjudicate compensation claims
and to determine the quantum of damages should be
vested in a quasi-judiciary entity with experience in de-
termining such matters. The setting up of such an entity
should be provided for in the guidelines and the policies.
The prosaic responsibility of the RECs should be
expanded to include ensuring that comprehensive insur-
ance for research related injuries is provided for and that
the informed consent form and the participant informa-
tion leaflets do not contain any provisions that might
seek to induce the participants to waive their rights to
compensation for research related injuries. Furthermore,
RECs should ensure that the informed consent forms
and the participant information leaflets adequately com-
municate to the participant the processes to be followed
and the relevant contact details of responsible persons in
the event of research related injuries.
Conclusion
Many factors, among them, large numbers of treatment
naïve populations, disease prevalence and relatively
lower costs, have contributed to make BRICS countries
increasingly a destination of clinical trials. However,
challenges arise when it comes to dealing with compensa-
tion for research related injuries. The court based
systems are often too slow, cumbersome and inad-
equate. It is therefore imperative to enact legislations
that protect the participants but also do not stifle the
research enterprise. There is need for consistency and
even harmonization of such regulations at a global
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level. A model policy on compensation for research
related injuries should borrow from the best aspects
of the different policies of the BRICS countries and
should be informed by the cardinal ethics principles
of autonomy, justice and beneficence.
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